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CHAPTER 1
OVERVIEW
In 1962,

James C. Davies published an article in the

American Sociological Review entitled "Toward a Theory of
Revolution".

In it he proposed that revolutions,

the separate theories of Marx and Tocqueville,

contrary to

occur along a J-

curve - a graphed relationship between needs satisfaction and
time showing a gradual increase with a rapid descent occurring
at the peak

. He combined the theories of Marx and Tocqueville

to reach his premise.
Early on Marx and Engels fathered the idea that the
capitalist degradation of the working class would eventually
lead to the workers hurling off the chains of oppression in a
revolution against the bourgeoisie.
Sometime after the "Communist Manifesto", however, Marx
also wrote that revolutions may occur for some other reason:
...although the enjoyments of the workers
have risen, the social satisfaction that they
give has fallen in comparison with the
increased enjoyments of the capitalist, which
are not accessible to the worker, in

1

2

comparison with the state of development of
society in general.1
In short,

"degradation produces revolution."2

This was also the basis of de Tocqueville1s argument.

It

is derived from his study of the French Revolution. He suggests
that "[e]vils which are patiently endured when they seem
inevitable become intolerable when once the idea of escape from
them is suggested. "3
Davies uses both of these theories
de Tocqueville1s)

(Marx's latter one and

for the building of his own:

"Revolutions are

most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective
economic and social development is followed by a period of
sharp reversal."4 In his 1962 article Davies applied his theory
to two successful revolutions and a failed rebellion: The
Egyptian Revolution of 1952,
and Dorr's Rebellion of 1842.

The Russian Revolution of 1917,
In all three cases he supported

I.James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution,"
American Sociological Review 27 (February 1962) citing
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "Wage Labor and Capital,"
Selected Works in Two Volume (Moscow: Foreign Languages
Publishing House,
2.Ibid.,
3.Ibid.
4.Ibid.

5.

1955):

94.

his theory with detailed historical data;

each of these cases

fit very well into the J-Curve Theory. At the end of this
article he also suggested other revolutions and social
disturbances that may also follow his J-Curve Theory. Those
include Leisler's Rebellion in 1689,
The French Revolution,
1863,

The American Revolution,

the draft riots in New York City of

and the riots in Nyasaland in 1959.
In a 1969 paper Davies applied his theory to the American

Civil War of 1861,

the Nazi Revolution of 1933,

and the Black

Rebellions of the 1960's. He also reexamined a previously
touched upon case - The French Revolution.
A negative case to his theory in which all of the J-Curve
predictive were in place was the Great Depression of the 1930'
in the United States. Davies believed there were two main
reasons why neither rebellion nor revolution occurred:

1)

The

American government aggressively attacked the problem with
government relief efforts and programs that,

successful or not

demonstrated a true compassion for the downtrodden. The
government also worked closely with the business sector
eliciting the cooperation of businessmen during the crucial
months of 1933.

These efforts helped to eliminate any

impression that the affluent did not care about the needs of

4
the downtrodden, and solidified the government and business
community,

in the public's eye,

This leads to the second reason.

as holder's of the same values.
2)

Americans,

at the time, had

a core value of beliefs that held them together -individualism,
hard work,

justice,

etc.

- that did not allow for a crack to

develop among any of those that felt alienated during the
Depression.

The closest any crack came to emerging was in

Louisiana with the movement led by Huey Long. This movement
gave way to the constitutionalism that ran deep in most
American's veins.
Davies was not alone in this belief. Lawrence Stone also
suggests that

11

[s] ome think that a potentially revolutionary

situation in the United States in the 1930's was avoided by
political action."5 Further,
Davies"

Isaac Kramnick "reformulated"

theory around this particular incident:
Revolutions are products of a sudden
widening of the gap between expectation and
gratification when it is perceived, correctly
or incorrectly, that the governing is either

18:2

B.Lawrence Stone. Theories of Revolution.
(January 1966): 167.

World Politics

responsible for or incapable of dealing with
this intolerable situation.s

Relative Deprivation
The term Relative Deprivation first appeared in the 1940'
and has since been used in sociological work for "operational
purposes".

In 1970 Ted Gurr developed a theory of Relative

Deprivation in his book Why Men Rebel.
first,

In the text he cites,

the conventional definition for Relative Deprivation "a

actors' perception of discrepancy between their value
expectations and their value capabilities."7; Gurr defines it
for his own purposes as "a negative discrepancy between
legitimate expectations and actuality."8
Gurr identifies two hybrids of his theory that have
relevance to this paper and the hypothesis proposed:
Aspirational Deprivation and Progressive Deprivation.

The

Aspirational Deprivation theory is based on historical

6.Isaac Kramnick.
Reflections on Revolution: Definition
and Explanation in recent Scholarship.
History and Theory
(1972): 44.
7.Ted Gurr. Why Men Rebel. (Princeton University Press,
Princeton, New jersey: 1970): 24.
8.Ibid,

25.

citations by Gurr;

Progressive Deprivation is the generalized

"J-Curve Theory" proposed by Davies.
Aspirational Deprivation is characterized "by an increase
in men's value expectations without a concomitant change in
value position or potential."9 Briefly,
without actual materialization.

expectations rise

In this theory men do not lose

what they have but feel they cannot achieve any of the values
they see others acquiring.

Because of this their demands become

greater and intensified:
It may be a demand for new values never
previously held, such as political
participation for colonial peoples and
personal equality for members of lower class
and caste groups...it may represent
intensification of the commitment to a value
position that earlier was weakly sought, for
example intensifying demands for welfare
goods among those who experience breakdown of
communal life during the early stages of
modernization, and intensified demands for
access to political elite positions among the
upwardly mobile. . .10
The following graph illustrates Gurr's Aspirational
Deprivation theory.

9.Ibid,
10.Ibid,

24.
50-51.

RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND THE IMPETUS TO VIOLENCE
high

value expectationj
Collective
value
position
value capabilities

low
Time

->

Aspirational deprivation.
Thus,

the higher expectations of the static group are

created by the observance of some other group or individual
obtaining a higher value position. Would this apply to a
colonized country wherein the colonizers demonstrate a capacity
to achieve a higher value position while the indigenous people
remain at their pre-colonial level? The question urges for this
hybrid theory to be used as the alternative in the hypothesis.
-v
The Progressive deprivation theory is Davies'

own theory.

In his description of this theory, Gurr makes some specific
points that are relevant to this paper.

First,

the J-Curve

"pattern is most coxranon in societies undergoing simultaneous
ideological and systematic change."11 Secondly,

the "...mob

violence by African colonial peoples against their rulers

11.Ibid,

53.

8
resembles the J-Curve argument."12 Lastly,
capabilities,

" [i] ncreasing

as an object of government policy,

require

increasing mobilization of citizens for participation in the
market economy and political life."13 This is quite often the
case in colonized countries.
Both of the hybrid theories of Relative Deprivation are
essential to this study.

The former,

as noted above, will be

used as the alternative to the latter.

The J-Curve and Fear
The J-Curve is a graphed relationship between needs
satisfaction

(jc-axis)

and time

(y-axis) .

It displays the

increasing ability of a society to fulfil more of its needs;
Davies categorized these as basic needs,

social needs,

need for equal dignity and justice."14 In short,

and "the

a progressing

society.
The curve begins at the point where human beings are so
oppressed that just staying alive is their only concern

12.Ibid,

54.

13.Ibid.
14.Davies,

8.

(Louis

9
Gottschalk also recognizes this in a 1944 article when he wrote
that the need "for personal improvement...[is such]

the

discontented do not have time to think in terms of social
betterment."15 - often times disrupting even basic family
structures if fulfilling these needs is extremely difficult.
The curve starts with a slow progression and rapidly becomes
more vertical. At a point in the curve's rapid ascension there
comes movement by the government
the gains made.
this point;

(or appears to be)

to suppress

The curve takes a dramatic downward turn at

it is at this point that revolution occurs. The

following graph illustrates Davies'

J-Curve theory.

Nod Satibtaction and RjcvoLtmow

15.Louis Gottschalk.
Causes of Revolution.
Journal of Sociology 1 (July 1944) : 4.

American

Davies holds that this sharp movement downward creates a
fear among people that they will lose the gains made or will
not be able to continue satisfying their needs at the current
level. An important note:

"Although physical deprivation in

some degree may be threatened on the eve of all revolutions,
need not be the prime factor,

as it surely was not in the

American Revolution of 1773."1S This reflects his idea that
revolutions may occur when people are not actually suffering
from economic deprivation but feel their expectations of
continual progression may be in doubt.
Isaac Kramnick suggests that Davies1
solely in economic determinism.

theory is based

To him the psychological fear

(without the realization of economic deprivation)

that gains

will be lost is a result of material economic conditions at t'.
time.
Try as [Davies] may, all the indices are
fundamentally economic in character. It is
easy to talk of the mood of people, of states
of mind; but when the presentation turns to
its hard factual foundation, Davies cites
only economic reality as putative proof of
what must have been certain psychological
reactions of frustration and aggression.

16.Ibid.

11

A simple economic determinism is at work
here.17
There is no way to scientifically observe the disposition of a
people immediately before a revolution,
editorials.
uprisings,

There are,

however,

save for polling or

"statistical data...on rural

strikes, unemployment,

costs of living...which it is

assumed can be correlated with the popular mood."18

Revolution Defined
There are as many ways to define revolution,
there are revolutionary theorist.

it seems,

as

In the literature review for

this paper several complete definitions for the term emerged.
One popularly used definition
"...change,

(prior to the 1970's) was

effected by the use of violence,

and/or regime,

in government,

and/or society."19 Going back to the 1940's,

Louis Gottschalk defines revolution as "...a popular movement
whereby a significant change in the structure of a nation or

17.Isaac Kramnick,
18.Ibid.
19.Stone,

167.

42.

12
society is effected."20

Both of these definitions are broad and

encompassing and this is exactly why they are not suitable for
the work at hand.
The working definition to be used in this paper is the one
Davies used in his original work:

"[V]iolent civil disturbances

that cause the displacement of one ruling group by another that
has a broader popular basis for support."21 This definition
rules out coup d'etat for coups do not necessarily engage broad
popular support;

they are,

at best,

the replacement of one

ruling elite group or person with another. The phrase "violent
civil disturbance" also invalidates using this definition for
it is most often used to describe social change that is
repeatedly referred to as "revolution". The "Conservative
Revolution"
1960's,

in the 1980's or the "Sexual Revolution" of the

both in the United States,

are examples of this.

Rebellions are also dismissed from this definition because the
definition itself calls for the displacement of a ruling

20.Louis Gottschalk,

6.

21.Davies, Toward a Theory of Revolution.

6.

13
group:"rebellions do not remove the established government but
instead are contained..."22

Supporting Material for Davies' TheoryThere is a great deal of prior work that,
and allegations,

supports Davies'

through hints

theory. As previously noted,

Tocqueville saw revolution as a result of improving conditions
within a society. Crane Brinton and Lyford Edwards also viewed
revolutions as the result of improving economic conditions and
rising classes.
Rex Hopper,

iri his essay "The Revolutionary Process",

developed a framework for the study of revolutions.

In his

preliminary stage he identifies as part of the sociopsychological sequence toward revolution "wish repression" and
"the increase in wealth,

intelligence,

and power of

'repressed

groups' . "23
Chalmers Johnson premised that revolutions occur because
of a dysfunction

(lack of harmony between the social system on

the one hand and the political system on the other).

22.Ibid,

In this

6.

23.Rex Hopper.
Forces, 1950, 271.

"The Revolutionary Process".

Social

14
theory he notes that the most common factor involved in giving
birth to a revolution is the "rapid economic growth"
experienced by a society.24

Developing the Question
Davies'

theory is based upon economic developments in the

countries where he studied revolutions. Therefore,
essential that the history,

it is

especially the economic history,

of

the countries in this paper be at the center of the question to
be answered.
Therefore,
nay,

the questions are straightforward with little,

no ambiguity: Do the economic events that preceded the

Algerian Revolution of 1954 and the Vietnamese Revolution of
1945 follow the J-Curve Theory as proposed by James Davies in
1962? If not,

do the events follow the Aspirational Deprivation

model as proposed by Gurr?

Hypothesis and the Alternative
The overwhelming evidence shown by Davies in his case
studies would lead one to believe that his theory is virtually

24.Stone,

165.

15
law.

This is exactly why his theory needs to be tested in this

study,

and in other cases in the future - to establish if his

theory is consistent or whether the revolutions he studied
simply fit his J-Curve by fortune. My hypothesis for this study
is an expectation that the events

(especially economic events)

from the time of French colonization until the revolutions in
both Algeria and Vietnam correspond with Davies'

J-Curve model.

If the events in one or both do not fit the J-Curve pattern,
then 1 expect one or both to fit the Aspirational Deprivation
pattern.

Why Algeria and France?
This paper is a comparison of two nations that experienced
revolutions during the 1950's - Vietnam and Algeria. Although
one is in North Africa and the other is in Southeast Asia,

the

similarities are remarkably striking. Both countries are part
of what is now termed the Global South; both were colonized
during France's colonization period; both had traditional
economic systems in place before and during the colonization
period; both are moving toward "progressive" societies today;
the events

(colonization and subsequent revolution)in both

countries occurred at approximately the same time;

lastly, both

16
had populations which practiced religions other than
Christianity before the colonization period.
Vietnam and Algeria were chosen for two reasons.
unlike the American Revolution,

First,

the revolutions in these two

countries were carried out by the indigenous people. Davies
successfully demonstrated that the events leading to the
colonist's revolution in America fit the J-Curve
extraordinarily well. Will that occur with indigenous
revolutions against a colonizer? Secondly,

although both

countries possess several similarities there is a striking
difference that will lend life to this study. Vietnam itself
was an established,

colonizing country

when the French

appeared on the scene; Algeria was simply a collection of
ancient tribes that had never been organized into a nationstate. What effect does this dissimilarity have on the
hypothesis?
The regime structures in both Vietnam and Algeria during
the colonial period were quite similar and yet different. Each
country was run by a Governor-General appointed by the French
government.

In Algeria the daily affairs of state were

transferred from the French government/military to the Algerian
National Assembly

(controlled by French settlers)

in the late

17
nineteenth century. Their power was supported by a Council of
Mayors,

also controlled by the French settlers. The power of

the assembly was also supported by the French government at
home.
In Vietnam the settlers were never powerful nor numerous
enough to set up the same representative-type body. There was a
Governor-General in charge of running the country's affairs.
However,

he usually maneuvered through the Vietnamese emperor's

people and institutions. Again,

the French government supported

the Governor-General and usually relied on him to carry out its
wishes. Also,

in Vietnam the military played a significant role

in the affairs of state throughout France's occupation.

Methodology
In his 1969 paper Davies laid the basis for the work to be
done in this area. He states that in general theory
abstract)

(the

one could state the same thing about one

revolution or another; but,

like most other things,

each

revolution is unique. He continues:
And from the practical research standpoint,
directly comparable data are not available
for all revolutions ... In many nations now,
the seeds of revolution are sprouting. But
established governments in these nations are

18

not likely to welcome social scientists in
search of data by conducting public opinion
surveys inquiring about attitudes toward the
government.25

This paper will be done from a historical reference;
looking back from the fact and identifying economic conditions
in each revolution that may result in a J-Curve model.

This is

not to rule out the possibility that other events and/or people
may have had a significant role in the production of these
revolutions. An infinity of antecedents are possible triggering
points of revolutions; yet,

the purpose here is to see if these

two revolutions lead us closer to the creation of a
generalization

(when/why revolutions occur)

of the J-Curve

approach.
The research for this paper has been done using secondary
and primary source material found in the documentation of
France's colonization of Algeria and Vietnam and subsequent
revolutions in both countries. Time and technology have allowed
the events cited to be well documented and the data varies
little from source to source.

2 5.Davies,
694-695.

The J-Curve of Rising and Declining...,

19
This paper will examine the historical aspects of French
colonization,
revolution,

the role of nationalism leading up to each

the economic profiles of each country as they begin

to become progressive societies,

and will provide a concluding

section wherein the data cited will be applied to Davies'
theory.

Limitations on the StudyThere were several identifiable limitations to the
development of this paper.

First,

an on-site study was not an

option in the development of this paper due to economic,
personal,

and professional restrictions. The data that may be

found by researching within each of these countries may lend
more certainty to this study.
Secondly,

any reliable government documents for standard

of living and economic growth and development in the nineteenth
century are scarce for Algeria and Vietnam. The French
government,
country,

though organized on these matters in its own

did little as far as data collection in these two

countries until the eve of their own expulsion.

20
Also,

much of the evidence cited in this paper is based on

evidence found by other researchers in this field. More often
than not their data coincides with each other.

CHAPTER 2
ALGERIA

Background to the Revolution
Algeria, until the successful conclusion of the revolution
against France in 1962,

had been a land of tribal people almost

always under the control of an empire. The Phoenicians,
Carthaginians,

Romans,

Vandals,

Belisarians,

Spanish,

Turks,

and French occupied the country during their colonization
periods. All of these colonizers centered their administrative
facilities and personnel in Algiers,
Mediterranean Sea,

the port city on the

and in other cities on the six hundred mile

coast from Morocco to Tunisia.
The influence of each of the colonizers reached,
varying distance,
came and went,

further inland from Algiers and,

in

as each one

left a particular stamp on the people. The most

notable of these legacies are those of the Turks and French.
The Turks dominated the area for nearly 3 00 years and when they
left the people of the area spoke Arabic

21

22

and practiced Islam (with some residual Animism) which is still
with them today.
The French came in the 1830's and stayed until the midtwentieth century. Their contributions and impact on the region
were as impressive and long lasting as the Turks'
so.

- if not more

The French brought a basket of goods with them that are

today an integral part of Algerian society. Among their
contributions are language,
arable farmland,
democracy

infrastructure,

administrative processes,

(in theory,

an increase in
and,

lastly,

liberal

if not in practice) .

And yet through all the conquest,

the people of the

Algerian area remained basically tribal and kept their
traditions and practices alive - a drawback for the hopeful
colonizers.

This is noted in many works on the subject. The

followers of the nineteenth-century Algerian revolutionary
leader Abd-el-Kader stated this fact very well when referring
to the French:
years,

"You are merely passing guests. You may stay 300

like the Turks,

but in the end you will leave."25 Also,

"...for a long time even after the French invasion the majority

26.Edward Behr. The Algerian Problem,
Horton, New York, 1962: 39.

1926. W.W.

23
of the people of what later became Algeria...were little if at
all concerned with the relations between the ruling groups and
the European powers."27
The French conquest began in May,

1830 when Charles X,

seeking to increase his public support which was suffering from
unfavorable domestic conditions,

launched an invasion force

into Algiers. His pretense for the invasion was based on an
incident that occurred in 1827.
The French Consul in Algiers met with the Dey of Algiers,
Husain,

in an effort to settle the long running dispute

concerning the grain debt incurred by the French to the Dey
during Napoleon's Egyptian and European expeditions. During the
course of the discussion the Dey became infuriated and whipped
the Consul with his fly-whisk.
Charles'

rule ended just months after the invasion

and France was to see a line of failed rulers and governments
for the next thirty years. This instability at home was not
promising for the French in Algeria. Policy changed so often
that the administration in Algiers eventually began to ignore
policy orders it did not agree with and create its own policy.

27.Roland Oliver and Anthony Atmore. Africa Since 1800.
Cambridge University Press,

England.

1967:

95-96.

24
Algiers and the rest of the coast fell quite easily to the
French.

In fact the coastal residents saw it simply as a

changing of the guard and the French as their new protectors.
...[T]he inhabitants of the coastal towns and
those social groupings which had
traditionally made up the allies of the Dey
proved friendly to the French and anxious to
accept their protection. The reason was
simply that the French were able to exploit
the age-old rivalry between the townsfolk and
the peasants of the coastal region on the one
hand and the men of the hills and mountains
on the other.28

This citation illustrates that the conquerors of Algiers
never really controlled and changed the people of the interior
who continued to live in their traditional tribes.
The Muslims of the interior were essentially the tribesmen
who had lived there for centuries and adopted Islam during the
Turks rule.

In 1832 Abd-el-Kader began a campaign to unite the

tribes of the interior and,
holy war)

consequently,

launched a jihad

(a

against the conquering French with a newly created

standing army.

This jihad brought the French out of the coastal

regions and into the inlands in an effort to defeat the tribal
troops.

In their efforts the French systematically gained

2 8.Behr,

25.

25
control of Abd-el-Kader1s territories until complete control of
modern-day Algeria was complete in 1857. The battles continued
through 1847 when Abd-el-Kader was captured by the troops of
the French General Bugeaud. His capture, however,

did not end

the sporadic fighting which would not desist until 1879.
In these newly conquered territories colons
initially from France but later from Spain,

(colonists),

Italy and Malta,

were brought in to occupy the land and the native inhabitants
were displaced to less fertile lands. These colons were
exceedingly poor people and most had made the trek to Algeria
in search of wages. Estimates on their numbers and growth vary
according to accounts.

For example,

one author suggests the

population of Europeans in Algeria by 1845 to have been
46,08029, while another puts the population at about 100,000 in
184730. These same sources saw dissimilar growth in the area as
well. The former submits the European population in 1880 to
have been between 245,000 and 276,000 while the latter puts the
number at 300, 000.31

29.Behr,

27.

30.Oliver,

97.

31.Note: The Cremieux decree of 1870 made all of these
settlers French citizens.

26
This new population of Europeans clashed with the native
inhabitants over land rights until the French administration
had completely displaced the natives and secured the most
fertile land for the colons. The distrust and hatred in nearly
every area between the Colons and Moslems was a never ending
story and,

as is noted below, was a primary cause of the

revolution in 1954.
In 187 0 the French military finally relinquished power in
part to the fall of the Second Empire and the army's defeat at
the hands of the Prussians. Civilian rule took over in Algeria
which was now an official French territory. The entire country
was securely in the hands of the French with military troops
maintaining control of the indigenous population in the
southern territories.

For the next half century France would

develop the interior of Algeria,

and Algeria would send

deputies to Paris "in the same way as the Alces Maritimes or
the Marne."32 The bel epoque in Algeria had begun by 1870.

32.Jane S. Nickerson. A Short History of North Africa. New
York:

Bilbo and Tannen:

190.

27
Nationalism
When the nationalist movement began,
occupation,

following the French

the indigenous people were at the initial point of

economic development in Davies' model;

its development fits the

model relatively accurately.
Abd-el-Kader was the first nationalist figure to appear in
French-held Algeria. After his demise,

there were no serious

nationalist movements until World War I ended.

In fact,

his fall the tribal mentality once again prevailed:
take generations of modernization,
tribes,

after

"It would

a break down of primitive

before the xenophobic instinct would give way to a

contemporary desire for a unified,

self-governing state."33 Abd-

el-Kader 's successes against the French were not lost in
history;

he eventually became an Algerian hero and inspiration.

By the turn of the century those "generations" had come to
pass.

Young,

Islamic Algerian nationalists,

born around the

turn of the century, were not the same group of people the
French encountered upon their arrival in 183 0 - and the French
were mostly responsible for the change. Displacement from one's

33.Behr,

42.

28
land,

immigration,

and education were the spring boards for the

nationalist movement.
During the latter-half of the nineteenth century French
development of the land and infrastructure essentiallyeliminated famine, while vaccines and quinine saved many an
Algerian who would have normally died through natural checks.
Though these developments represent an improvement in such
social and economic value areas as health and modernization,
they actually did little to help the population at large or in
the long-run. These two developments drove two things:

the

population up and many Algerians off of their land and into the
cities.

This fact is well documented by Kraft and Talbott,

respectively:
[Moslems]

"Squeezed out of traditional society,

they

migrated into the European sector of the economy.

From 1880-1920,

there flowed a steadily rising stream of people

from the tribes... into the centers of European colonization.1,34
"After 1870... improved sanitary conditions and the spread of
European medicine reduced the death rate,

34.Kraft,

19.

disrupting the
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mechanism that kept a peasant society from outstripping its
material resources."35
A significant number of those driven off the land sought
relief in France itself.
One escape... opened up for the landless and
homeless Moslems: temporary migration to
France. Set in motion in the 1890's when
Marseilles shippers imported Algerian labor
to fight a dock strike, the Moslem migratory
wave swelled during World War I and the early
twenties, ebbed during the Great Depression
and World War II, then swept back in the
postwar years.36

Of those Algerians who arrived, many stayed in France not
only learning in the schools but also learning from the
everyday life in Western Europe.
Emigration to France had a marked impact on
Algerian Muslim workers. The higher wages and
better labor conditions made them more
conscious of the economic inequalities
in Algeria. Most of the early arrivals
joined,or came under the influence of, the
French Communists and other leftist
parties.37

35.Talbott, 15.
36.Kraft, 23.
37.Paul A. Jureidini. Case Studies in Insurgency and
Revolutionary Warfare. Special Operations research Office, The
American University, Washington University. December,

1963:

29.
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Education also accounted for the rise of the Algerian
nationalists at the turn of the century.

French administrators

in the nineteenth century did not actively seek to educate the
indigenous Moslem population in the French colonial schools.
The French government allowed for the education of the
indigenous people to take place in the Qu'ranic schools but
only on the primary level
secondary schools

(these schools were called msid);

(madrasas)

the

were taken over by the French "in

order to assure a constant supply of loyal native
administrators."38 During this same time period the colons also
feared Moslems educated in the French school system. The colons
"believed to educate a colonized person would simply create a
potential troublemaker.1,39
The Algerians had their role to play in the educational
history,

too. Moslems,

unlike the Europeans of the time,

believed that education and religion went hand-in-hand.

Even if

the French were to allow Moslems into the colonial schools
(early on,

some modest attempts were made to allow for this)

3 8.Heggoy, Alf Andrew.

French Influence on North African

Education 1880-1962: An Introduction.

Proceedings and Papers of

the Georgia Association of Hi9tpriang—1996:
39.Ibid,

132.

131.
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the Moslem parents would not send their children.

They feared

"that French schools would proselytize their young Muslim
wards."40 For these reasons the education system in Algeria
remained segregated and two-tiered until the last decade of the
eighteen hundreds.41
By the end of the nineteenth century the Algerian Moslems
began to demand a French-based education for their children.
Their travels to France opened their eyes to the benefits such
an education would provide for their children in a rapidly
developing world.

The following two excerpts emphasize this

point:
Attitudes changed slowly, but after World War
I the refusal of Algerian parents to send
their children to colonial schools became a
demand that places be made for their children
in these same schools. Fear that Muslim youth
would be converted to Christianity had been
replaced by the realization that, as long as
France was mistress to the Maghrib, colonial
schools offered the best path to better jobs
in the slight but developing modern sectors
of the local economy. These schools also
opened doors to official bureaucratic
positions in the imperial administration.42

40.Ibid.
41.Note: Education for the masses of indigenous people
remained uncommon up through the 1950's.
42.Ibid.
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During the earliest years of the colonial
period opposition to colonialism had been the
opposition of the least Westernized groups,
whose leaders simply wanted to drive out the
Europeans and restore the situation which had
previously existed. From the mission schools,
however, there was beginning to emerge...a
new kind of opposition to colonialism. This
opposition did not aim to restore the precolonial situation. On the contrary, the aim
of the mission educated Africans was to
capture the political and religious
institutions introduced into Africa from the
West.43

Immigration and education,

therefore, were the driving

forces behind the nationalist movement as it entered the
twentieth century. These two areas,

as the evidence suggests,

also represent a value progression

(according to Davies model)

for at least part of the indigenous population.
From immigration and the demand for equal education in the
colonial schools arose a new type of young Algerian
nationalist,

referred to as evolues

(literally,

"the evolved

ones"). The schools they attended had a curriculum which was
"entirely French and allowed no place for Arabic studies...
[w]ithin a generation,

43.Oliver,

157.

a class of well-educated,

gallicized

33
Muslims...had been created."44 It was from this group that "a
new Algerian self-consciousness developed.
The evolues were not,

however,

1,45

a separate sub-group or

class entity like the Berbers or other clans.
made up of people from different religious,

The evolues were

ethnic and social

backgrounds from all parts of Algeria. Their individual
histories and cultures were as diverse as the people
themselves.

Their common bond was their belief and education in

Western ideas and their strive to be equal with their European
colonizers.
The new Algerian nationalists,
quite liberal

in the beginning, were

(in Western-European terms)

in their thinking.

appears these nationalists had their value expectations as
prescribed by Davies. They were a "Western-educated and
Western-inspired elite... followed by a vast population
unschooled in Western ways and concepts."46 The evolues'
education was rich in "the idea of progress,

44.Algeria! A Country Study,

equality before

ed. Helen Chapin Metz

(Federal Research Division Library of Congress,

1994):

37.

45.Ibid.
4 6.Kenyon Gillespie. Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution.
(Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, New York: 1960): 4.
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the law,

careers open to talent."47

Because of their French

education and intermingling with the colons and Metropolitan
Frenchmen,

they focused their efforts on working with the

French to realize the dream of one day having all Algerians
become full French citizens.
In fact,

the earliest of the nationalist leaders had their

reservations when talk arose of a separate Algerian country
(apart from France)

populated by Algerian people.

Ferhat Abbas,

a leading French-schooled nationalist and leader of the
Association of Moslem Students, made a statement in 1936
(written in 1934,

by some accounts)

that neither the French nor

the colons would ever allow him to forget:
Men who die for a patriotic ideal are
honoured and respected. But I would not die
for an Algerian fatherland, because no such
fatherland exist. I search the history books
and I cannot find it. You cannot build on
air.
This sentiment was not new to 193 6; The liberal approach
was being advocated before the first World War:
As early as 1912 a Moslem newspaper published
in Djidjelli, Rachidi, asked for full French
citizenship rights in return for Frenchimposed conscription laws in Algeria. In 1922
Abd-el-Kader's grandson, the Emir Khaled,

47.Ibid.
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himself a former captain in the French army,
protested against discrimination against
Moslems in the army's promotion system,
demanded selection in civilian and military
fields based on merit alone. Ferhat Abbas's
own goal, for a long time, was to be a
Frenchman. . .48

The liberal evolu.es were met time and again with
frustration from the French when their demands were put forth.
The French government cannot be held fully responsible for
neglecting the liberals;

even when the French government took

steps to rectify the problems their efforts were obstructed by
the colons.

"Various laws were passed to protect Algerian

property from land-greedy colons, but all too often they were
easily circumvented."49 Some members of the French government
even pleaded with the settlers to listen to the demands of the
liberals -

for their own sake. Maurice Violette,

Governor-

General of Algeria in the 1930's:
made a memorable speech in the National
Assembly: "These Moslems, when they protest,
you become indignant,; when they approve, you
become suspicious; when they keep quiet, you
become afraid...They crave

48.Behr, 43.
49.Alister Horne. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 19541962.(Viking Penguin, Inc., New York, New York: 1977): 31.
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to be admitted to your country. Should you
refuse, you may well fear that they will soon
create one.1,50

Despite the setbacks there were some accomplishments made
by the liberals and their allies in the French government,
though eventually thwarted by the settlers.
example,
idea)

the private-property code

In 1873,

(an essentially European

was imparted to the Moslem population;

was granted financial autonomy;

for

and in 1919,

in 1900 Algeria
in tribute to the

sacrifices made by Algerian Moslems in World War I,

George

Clemenceau forced through the Algerian Charter.

It was intended

to end unequal taxation, broaden the franchise,

create more

schools for the indigenous population,
indigenous property. The Charter,
product,

and protect the

however,

in its final

did little more than give the Moslems the right to

elect their own representatives. These were the final upward
movements of expectations upward.
One of the most far-reaching proposals made by the French
government to remove at least part of the obstacles was made in
1936 by the Blum-Violette Project

(Leon Blum was Premier of the

Popular Front Party in France). This is also the downward turn

SO.Behr,

48.
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of expectations by the liberals that gave life to the
independent nationalist movement.

This proposal was designed to

get to the heart of the liberal grievances by enabling Moslems
to enter into French citizenship without having to renounce
their Koranic laws within their private lives and allowing
certain groups of Moslems

(such as teachers and veterans)

to

vote in Colony wide elections for the French Chamber. This
measure "would have extended the franchise to about 21,000
Moslems:

4 per cent of the total."51 The proposal was met head

on by the settlers.
The failure of the Blum-Violette plan and the evidence of
the French weaknesses in their World War II defeat set the
stage for the nationalists to take a different approach. With
liberalism finding resistance at every turn,

the nationalists

leaders turned to efforts to eject the French outright.
One of the figures to lead this movement,

and convert many

liberals to his approach was Messali Hadj. Messali was a poorly
educated man who fought in the French army during World War I.
He stayed in France after the war and became well versed in
Communist ideology

5I.Kraft,

44.

(and the communists' belief in
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organization). While in France,
revolutionary groups.

he led,

and founded,

several

The group that would lead the

revolutionary movement was the Algerian Peoples'

Party

later to evolve into the National Liberation Front

(PPA)

(FLN).

Messali drew his base of support from the Moslem veterans
of World War I and the ill-educated, Arabic speaking people in
Algeria. His rhetoric was welcomed by those who had seen,
lived through,

and

the failures of the liberals.

From 1940 forward revolution became unavoidable. Any plans
put forward by French Prime Minister Charles De Gaulle or
Algerian Governor Pitain

(numerous and sizable after the French

saw the writing on the wall)
revolution.

were dismissed in favor of full

The idea of "French Algeria" had been replaced by

"Algerian Algeria"

(this term was used to identify an Algeria

independent of French entanglement).

The liberals, who for

nearly a half-century tried to work with the French, were now
in the fold of Messali and his revolutionist.

Economics
To put the economic profile of French Algeria into its
proper perspective,

one must study the development and

prospects of two separate groups:

the evolues and the Moslem
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masses. This is the study of two sides of the same coin.

First,

the masses.
The standard-of-living of the indigenous people when the
French arrived was exactly at the point Davies'

and others

called nothing more than survival. The mass of Moslem tribes
that populated the interior when the French arrived were
essentially living in a world gone by:
found herself crossing the centuries,

"At one jump Algeria
and from the Middle Ages

plunged suddenly into the mid-nineteenth century."52 They lived
off the land in homogeneous tribal units that rarely integrated
with other tribes because tribal customs and norms defined each
people.
Famine,

disease,

drought and famine were most responsible

for population control:
Not for any of these people was life a
pastoral Arcady. Ignorant and superstitious,
they were plunged in a perpetual battle for
survival by disease, famine, and nearly
constant tribal skirmishings. Extremes of
heat and cold plagued them; while spring
rains often threatened to flood them out.

52.Nickerson,

105.
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summer was an endless quest for water and
shade.53

Yet,

the system worked between nature and man and allowed

for the farming and grazing of the land that kept the
population flourishing:

"Though hardly glorious,

there did

prevail a civilization with a delicate inner balance. This
balance the French occupiers destroyed.1,54
A middle class,

small though it was,

pre-colonial structure.

existed within this

It generally developed among the five

to six per cent that dwelt within the cities and consisted of
religious and legal types. However, most of the population
lived in the interior in the nomadic tribes and eked out a
living from the land.
With France's arrival in 1830 two events quickly changed
the complex of the economy that had existed and fit well into
Davies' model.
eradicated.

First,

the middle class that had existed was

"The small Algerian middle stratum of urban

merchants and city artisans was squeezed out,

53.Kraft,
54.Ibid.

26.

and landowners of
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the country side were dispossessed."55 The French quicklyconverted the mosques into churches and Arabic law was replaced
by the Western system.

The Moslem middle class would not

reemerge until the end of the nineteenth century in the form of
the evolues.
Secondly,

there was a large displacement of the tribal

people from the fertile lands onto the poorer lands of the
region.

From the earliest arrival of soldiers the best lands in

Algeria were taken by the French,

and this displacement

continued throughout the 1800's. At first the French stayed
near the coast and began the drainage of the Mitidja
"mosquito-ridden marshes"56 surrounding Algiers)
farming on this area.

( the

and began

It was not until French forces began to

seek out Abd-el Kader's forces did the land snatching begin in
earnest. As the colons arrived they began to settle the
occupied lands of the hinterlands taken by the French forces
from Abd-el- Kader. Within nine years following the invasion
the European population reached 25,000 with 11,000 being
Frenchmen.

The government encouraged their settlement at the

5 5.Metz,
5 6.Horne,

17.
32.

42
expense of the indigenous population in an effort to further a
Gallic civilization:

Free land was made available to individuals
by the arbitrary confiscation of indigenous
holdings. In 1840 certain Algerian tribes
were placed on restricted reservations
(cantonments) and their remaining land was
appropriated. All lands belonging to
Algerians who had taken up arms against the
French were confiscated on November 1 of that
year...All nondeveloped properties for which
no justifiable titles were held prior to July
1, 1830 [noting, of course, the tribes had no
need for such European things as
titles ],
were proclaimed to be government land in 1844
and 1846.57

French land speculators were brought in to devour the
former tribal lands thus victimizing the indigenous population:
In one notorious transaction...a settler
bought for twenty francs a small share of a
700-acre parcel of land belonging jointly to
513 Arabs; he divided the whole parcel into
shares for each holder, charging for his
troubles 11,000 Francs; when that fee could
not be met, he acquired the whole 700
acres .58

57.Jureidini,
58.Ibid.,

21.

20.
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As the French continued on, many of the displaced people
began to move to the cities in search of a living.
Displaced villagers and tribesmen flocked to
towns and cities, where they formed an
unskilled labor mass, ill-adapted to
industrial work, scorned by Europeans, and
isolated from the kinship units that had
formerly given them security and a sense of
solidarity.5S
These city immigrants were caught between a dying world their tribal world - and a newly emerging one that they were
not prepared to enter.
Bidonvilles,

They lived among the Europeans in

or tin-can towns, which were structures made of

the basest of materials. These people were considered to be the
subproletariat class since the colon working class made up the
proletariat class. They worked at the most menial jobs making a
fraction of the wages the colon worker earned.

In short,

the

indigenous masses reaped little of the economic profits made in
Algeria.
Industrialization, which may have brought some economic
relief to these homeless,

displaced people,

had not emerged in

Algeria by as late as 1954 due in large part to a
economic compact'

59.Metz,

17.

4

colonial

supported by the wealthy colons. The
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'compact'
(grapes,

allowed them to export their agricultural products
grasses,

tobacco,

etc.)

to France thus encouraging

agricultural production over industrialization. The wealthycolons,

meanwhile,

invested their money into businesses based

in France.
The French levied a disproportionate amount of the tax
burden on the shoulders of the indigenous Moslem population
which added to their "survival only" existence.
instance,

In 1909,

for

"Muslims, who made up almost 90 percent of the

population but produced 20 percent of Algeria's income, paid 70
percent of direct taxes and 45 percent of the total taxes
collected. "60
Thus,

the mass of indigenous people were plagued by land

displacement,

discrimination, unemployment and disproportionate

taxing at the hands of the French. Alister Horne described the
situation best:
Thus in the all-important realm of
agriculture, as indeed in that of industrial
development later, the colons could
reasonably claim that they had created the
country out of virtually nothing. But it was
the same old, old story of the Europeans with
their superior technique, resources and
aggressive vigour progressively assimilating

60.Metz,

33.
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the best lands, while at the same time the
more numerous indigenes were being pushed out
on to the more peripheral lands.61
The French,

in spite of all their atrocities,

did bring to

the population as a whole an improved standard of living. But
was it substantial enough to bring the masses of people up
along the J-Curve? The evidence suggest it wasn't. Yet,
improvements were made:
above,

improved medical conditions,

noted

increased the population and extended the life span;

the

French created a network of railroads between the major cities;
they improved the ports
airports);

(and in the twentieth century built the

they constructed modern communication systems;

although they fought to not educate the indigenous people,

and,
they

gave rise to the evolues through education. This would be their
undoing.
The evolues were a purely French creation. The evolues'
desire was not to eject the French from Algeria but to
assimilate all Algerians into Frenchmen. Their actions stemmed
from their Western education and immersion into French life both in Algeria among the colons and in metropolitan France.
The evolues'

61.Horne,

32.

roots took hold around 1870,

the same time
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military rule gives way to civilian rule in Algeria.
French,

in need of interlocuteurs valables

betweens")

for themselves and the masses,

The

("valid goenlisted the services

of a small percentage of the population to fulfill this role.
Their name among the people soon become Beni Oui Ouis,

or "The

tribe of yes men." Their income was well above the lower class
indigenous masses yet substantially lower than the European
middle class. Because of this they were accepted in neither
circles and,

at the same time, moved in both. The fracture

between the evolues and the indigenous lower class and the
ruling colons is well noted in the following two citations:
[i]ndeed from the beginning there was little
love lost between them [evolues] and the
Muslim masses, who saw their natural leaders
seduced away by titles, medals, and
privileges to support a system which confined
them in a position of permanent
inferiority.62
"The colons who ran Algeria maintained a condescending dialogue
only with the beni-oui-ouis .1,63
The "yes men" accumulated a good deal of wealth and access
in their positions. The evidence suggests they were moving

62.Nickerson, 192.
63.Metz, 34.
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upward along the J-Curve. They were able to:
children with French-based educations,
lower strata of European society,
Muslim middle class,

1.provide their

2.marry into some of the

and 3.revive the "traditional

eliminated during the middle of the 19th

century. "64
The greatest objection the evolues had with the French was
the denial of indigenous Moslems French citizenship

(entailing

all the rights and power that go along with it) without
abandoning their status under Muslim civil law. Proposals were
made by the French government in 1865 and 1871 to offer
citizenship to Moslems,

French

but such citizenship required

repudiation of Muslim civil law. This dilemma was finally
resolved in the 1920's but,
was too late.

64.Jureidini,

31.

again,

the reaction by the French

CHAPTER 3
VIETNAM
Before a discussion of Vietnamese nationalism and
economics in relation to the J-Curve can proceed there are some
historical peculiarities that must be noted that set Vietnam
apart from the Algerian situation. These differences are:

1. the

Chinese influence upon the Vietnamese culture and government,
and 2.the colonization by Vietnam of surrounding lands before
the arrival of the French. These characteristics must be
recognized and considered before moving forward.
Vietnam was settled by the Viet people, northern migrants
from south China,

about one thousand years ago. Their history

has been recorded in detail in numerous publications. The point
here is to underscore the historical aspects that make Vietnam
different from the Algerian case.
The Vietnamese,
domination,

after several hundred years of Chinese

gained their independence approximately nine

hundred years ago. With this independence came a considerable

48
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amount of Chinese cultural and governmental baggage in both
philosophical and material dimensions.
First,

the Chinese gave to the Vietnamese a Confucian-

based governmental system and philosophy for living. This
philosophy,

as applied to the governmental operations, produced

a centralized system of government. The government was headed
by an emperor who ruled by the theory of divine right. Under
him,

the government was staffed by people who passed civil

service test

(adopted from the Chinese)

to acquire their

positions.

The government that evolved was,

structure.

In action,

in short,

a pyramid

this did not lead to smooth execution:

In practice, the antiquarian Confucian
philosophy often led to reactionary attitudes
and harsh enforcement of arbitrary laws. In
general, few but the wealthy could afford the
study time for the examinations, yet this did
not produce a fixed class structure. A
wealthy family that produced no scholars soon
declined. Often villages or family clans
would subsidize a poor but bright village
boy, for his successes would bring honor to
them all.65

The Chinese-influenced culture came into conflict with the
Chinese-influenced Vietnamese government. The Vietnamese

65.Chester A. Bain. Vietnam: The Roots of Conflict.
(Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1967): 14.
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communal structure was,

and to a great extent continues to be,

a village- centered society. The village is the organizational
hub for most Vietnaunese;

the role of the government is dwarfed

by the family and the village.

In fact,

a Vietnamese saying

encompasses this thought completely: The power of the emperor
ends at the village fence.
The Confucian philosophy adopted from the Chinese also had
its bearing on Vietnamese religion. Before the arrival of the
French and Catholics most Vietnamese worshiped their dead
ancestors. This philosophy led the Vietnamese to place the
family,

and respect within the family,

above all else.

In fact,

in most traditional homes there are still altars set up for
families to pray to their ancestors.
Materially the Chinese gave to the Vietnamese a life
centered around agriculture - specifically,

rice growing. This

method of subsistence kept them away from the mountains and
focused the mass of the population along the flood plains of
the rivers and around the river deltas.

The Vietnamese learned

from the Chinese the methods for flooding the plains to grow
rice. This livelihood was the center of village activity in
almost all Vietnamese villages - save for those which focused
on craftsmanship, which were very few in number.

Thus,

the Chinese influence permeated all aspects of

Vietnamese life until the French colonization period. This
influence can still be found,

at least in part,

in the culture

today.
The Vietnamese originally began,

and governed,

in the

northern and central province of Tonkin and Annam (a term given
by the French) .

From there the Vietnamese began a slow process

of colonization southward in to the province of Cochin china
(present day southern Vietnam). The early emperors had their
sights set on conquering the entire lands that separated Siam
from China.

These lands included the present day countries of

Laos and Cambodia. The emperors were colonizing in an attempt
to become an Asian power;

if possible,

to replace China as the

region's dominant power. Over the centuries the Vietnamese
emperors managed to colonize large portions of both Laos and
Cambodia. When the French colonized Vietnam,

they retained

these territories for themselves.
It was under this framework that the French first
encountered the Vietnamese. Vietnam was a very old,
nation

independent

(older at the time than most European nations)

that had

long established itself under the guidance of Chinese
influence.

It was also a colonizing nation seeking,

if not for

52
industrial purposes,

the same glory and power the conquering

French sought.

French Colonization
Thus,

unlike the situation in Algeria,

the French

government was not first on the scene in Vietnam. Catholic
missionaries from France began arriving in Vietnam nearly a
century before the arrival of the French military and settlers
(those that did come)

in the mid-lSOO's.

In fact,

it was the

alleged maltreatment of the missionaries by the emperor's
government that gave the French their in-road into Vietnam in
the form of harbor bombings;

retaliation by the Vietnamese

against the Catholics further justified French interference.
Thieu Tri,

the emperor of Vietnam from 1841-1847 and ruler

during the first French attack on the Vietnamese fleet at Da
Nang in 1847,

"denounced Catholic priests as foreign agents who

should be killed on sight."66 Yet, he saw the French attack for
what it was - the beginning of a conquest looking for an
excuse.

For this reason he did not execute a single missionary

during his reign.

66. William J. Duiker. Vietnam.(Westview Press: Boulder,
Colorado: 1982): 70.
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Thieu Tri was stuck between a rock and a hard place.

To

protect his country from the French would require modernization
of the entire country; however, modernization would disrupt the
feudal system that kept the imperial system working.

To save

his country would require losing his authority.
His son and successor,

Tu Due, was confronted with the

same dilemma:
Tu Due...clung even more stubbornly to the
belief that Vietnam could not disrupt its
feudal institutions for the sake of security.
Embarking on a fierce campaign to eliminate
Christianity, he thereby antagonized the
French just as they were exploring ways to
escalate their offensive against his country.
His myopic intransigence made him the last
independent ruler of Vietnam.67

On the other hand Tu Due was a very capable and moderate
leader who opposed the Catholic missionaries for very germane
reasons. He felt the missionaries threatened to undermine the
Confucian basis that legitimated his power. He was also
concerned,

and rightly so,

that the missionaries "actually

represented French political and military interests.,,S8

67.Ibid.
68.Ibid.
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This resistance to modernize and the resolute adherence of
the emperor and his people to remain in a feudal way of life
indicates the Vietnamese were in a peculiar position on either
economic model at the time of the French arrival.

The

Vietnamese were not necessarily at the simple survival stage
the Algerians were in but they were also not in the
progressive,

industrial stage of their conqueror either. The

colonizing aspect of the nation reveals that they had surpassed
the life of basic survival and yet were existing at the
economic level of Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries.
The attack on the Vietnamese at Da Nang in 1848 was just
the beginning of clashes between the French and the Vietnamese.
The battles continued until 1861 when Tu Due "gave France the
three provinces adjacent to Saigon"69. The Vietnamese had fought
hard to keep the French out and now they felt they had been
betrayed by their own emperor. Even in betrayal the Vietnamese
launched a steady stream of resistance against the French who
had brought with them to Vietnam "iron and flame"

-

the

destructors of the feudal system. The Vietnamese continued to

69.Ibid,

76.
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fight a losing battle as the French continued to claim the
lands to the north. By 1883 the war was lost and Vietnam
belonged to the French:
The year 1883 witnessed the death of Tu
Due...It was the last year of independence
for nineteenth century Vietnam. The French
then moved in force on Tonkin. Meanwhile,
outside Hue, they bombarded the entrance to
the River of Perfumes and imposed a
protectorate on the Vietnamese imperial
court.70

Even after the complete take over of the country the
conflicts and skirmishes never really ended for the French in
Vietnam as they had in Algeria
century) .

(by the end of the nineteenth

The main factor for this was the nationalism that

continued to plague the French.

Vietnamese Nationalism
The nationalists'
way,

chronicle in Vietnam is,

in one marked

quite similar to the Algerians. As noted in the previous

section,

the Vietnamese nationalists fought the French for

every tract of land. .These original nationalists were fighting
to protect the feudal system that they developed over

70.Vietnam; A Country Study, ed. Ronald J. Cima.
Research Division Library of Congress, 1989): 27.

(Federal
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centuries.

"The first nationalist groups tried to fight with

traditional methods,

but with their failure,

subsequent leaders

turned to Western techniques."71 They were fighting to protect a
way of life that Western influence,
threatened and,

in the form of the French,

to a great degree did,

eliminate. This scenario

was quite similar to that in Algeria under Abd-el-Kader and his
campaign for pre-colonialism.
With French occupation there arose a Vietnamese
nationalism that was quite similar to that of Abd-el-Kader.
Through the mid-nineteenth century some Vietnamese nationalists
wanted to adopt Western technology and philosophy to achieve
their goal.

These nationalist resembled the Evolues in that

they wished to remain enmeshed in a French-Vietnam structure.
The vast majority,
Confucian-based,

however,

chose to use and retain their

feudal structure in their efforts to oust the

French.
"By the turn of the century,

a whole generation of

Vietnamese had grown up under French control."72 Like in
Algeria,

there was a class of nationalists in Vietnam who had

71.Bain, 3.
72.Cima, 3 5.
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reaped the benefits of French occupation:

they had studied in

France and their families had become quite wealthy working
within the French system. Unlike Algeria,
nationalists who,
French,

there was a group of

though well educated due in large part to the

sought to retain the feudal system of life.

Though

there emerged two distinct philosophies to the nationalist
cause they were both due to opportunities afforded them by
French occupation.

This scenario,

like the one in Algeria,

shows at least a segment of the society's population reaping
the values brought by the colonizer. This evidence combined
with the feudal structure and a relatively crude economic
structure

(compared with Western cultures)

pattern developing

again,

shows a J-Curve

at least among some of the

population.
The evidence of two distinct nationalist groups emerging
at the end of the century can be found in two figures:

Phan Boi

Chou- a devout nationalist - and Phan Chu Trinh - a western
influenced liberal.
Phan Boi never collaborated with French officials and was
a leader of the anticolonial movement. He had been "trained in
the Confucian tradition under his father and other local
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teachers."73 He had spent years studying and passed the regional
exam

(borrowed from the Chinese and maintained by the French)

in 1905.
Phan Boi's style of resistance may have been a result of
watching the French continuously crush any uprisings waged by
the Vietnamese scholar-gentry in the name of independence for
the emperor/feudal structure.

It is not certain but there was a

large group of nationalist's who thought and felt the same way.
Phan Boi,

and those who thought like him, wanted to drive the

French out and restore Vietnam's independence.
Phan Chu was a horse of a different color. Phan Chu
...was greatly influenced by the writings of
French political philosophers Rousseau and
Montesquieu, and he believed that the French
colonial administration could serve as a
progressive force to establish a Western
democratic political structure through
peaceful reforms.74

These two men,

and the groups they led,

tried to come to

some sort of working agreement when they met in Japan in 1906
as part of the Duy Tan Hoi

73.Ibid.
74.Ibid,

36.

(Reformation Society). They met for
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nearly two weeks but could reach no compromise over the type of
government each one foresaw for Vietnam.
Whereas Phan Boi Chou favored retaining the
monarchy as a popular ideological symbol and
as a means of attracting financial support,
Phan Chu Trinh wanted primarily to abolish
the monarchy in order to create a base on
which to build national sovereignty•75

Both Phan Boi and Phan Chu continued to work toward their
respective goals for the next quarter century - no matter if
they were free,

in prison or in exile.

It was Phan Boi's, not Phan Chu's, work which is
considered to be immeasurable to Vietnamese independence.
Although an advocate of much the same sentiment as Messali Hadj
in Algeria,

Phan Boi's failures were due to his inability to

incorporate the peasantry into his revolution - which Hadj had
accomplished

(possibly because Hadj was part of that

peasantry).
His [Phan Boi] greatest weakness, according
to many historians, was his failure to
involve the Vietnamese peasantry, who
composed 80 percent of the population, in his
drive for independence. Rather than
recruiting support at the village level, Phan
Boi Chau and his followers concentrated on
recruiting the elite, in the belief that the

75.Ibid.

peasant masses would automatically rally
around the scholar-gentry. 76

Future independence leaders would not make the same
mistake.
By the end of World War I the independence movement led by
the scholarly elite began to temporarily fade.

The French

scaled back both imports and investments to Vietnam which
opened the door for pro-French Vietnamese entrepreneurs.

These

entrepreneurs became "active in light industries such as rice
milling,

printing,

and textile weaving."77 These people became

pro-French but were,

like the Evolues,

frustrated by their

inability to achieve certain demands that would bring them on
even par with the French. They sought,
higher pay for Vietnamese officials,

among other things,

reformation of the

naturalization laws to make it easier for Vietnamese to become
French citizens,

and an end to the ethnic Chinese economic

domination over Vietnamese in Cochin china.78 The entrepreneurs

76.Ibid,

38.

77.Ibid,

39.

78.Note: The French sought out the Chinese to act as
middlemen and the Chinese came to dominate rice trade and retail
business in both urban and rural areas.
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frustration,
Algeria,

unlike the same encountered by the Evolues in

occurred earlier in the century and was not the

springboard for the Vietnamese revolution. Yet,

it shows again

an increasing economic position for at least a segment of the
society that follows the J-Curve model.

Ho Chi Minh
Ho Chi Minh, born in May,
Nien Cach Menh Dong Chi Hoi

1890,

founded the Viet Nam Thanh

(Revolutionary Youth League)

in

1925 - Its members later became known as the Viet Minh. Ho took
his revolutionary lessons from the Phan Boi philosophy;
is,

that

expulsion of the French, not compromise with the French. Ho

was a scholar from a poor peasant family. He was trained,
naturally,
however,

in the Confucian tradition.

In his adult years,

his revolutionary interests took him deep into the

throngs of people of Europe - especially into Russia and
France. His indoctrination into communism while in Russia would
be the impetus for his revolutionary work. Ho spent much of his
time outside of Vietnam but built a following around his
communist,

and,

ironically, nationalist,

doctrine.
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Ho's success began to develop between the two world wars
when Vietnamese incomes and working conditions had begun to
falter.
...[S]ince the beginning of the century,
working conditions and salaries had improved
little. The number of strikes rose from seven
in 1927 to ninety-eight in 1930. As the
effects of the worldwide depression began to
be felt, French investors withdrew their
money from Vietnam...Although both French
colons and wealthy Vietnamese landowners were
hit by the crisis, it was the peasant who
bore most of the burden because he was forced
to sell at least twice as much rice to pay
the same amount in taxes or other debts.79

The depression and Ho's Leninist/nationalist teachings
worked hand in hand to accomplish what Phan Boi could not incorporate the peasantry into the independence movement. Ho
drew much of his support from the villages and utilized them
more extensively than the elite when the revolution began. By
the time the Japanese withdrew after World War II, Ho would be
the philosophical,

if not material leader,

of a great deal of

Vietnam.
In December 1946 the Vietminh was supported
by the majority of the nation because, when
it went to war against France, it carried on

79.Ibid,

43.
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a nationalist tradition which stretched back
to Emperor Ham Nghi .80

It wasn't until Ho dropped the nationalist disguise did any of
his supporters abandon ship in favor of the French-backed
regimes.
Ho,

however, was not a member of the elite. His revolution

against the French incorporated the most economically deprived
of the Vietnamese people. Most of the Vietnamese landed-gentry
put their support behind such French-backed leaders as Ngo Dinh
Diem.

This indicates that this revolution is more in line with

the Aspirational Deprivation model proposed by Gurr than
Davies'

J-Curve model.

The Japanese occupation of Vietnam during World War II left
void any real outside power to control the people. The Japanese
were content to leave the administration of the country in the
hands of the defeated French personnel - which remained the
case until 1945 when the Japanese military position was quickly
weakening and they evicted the French personnel and took over
the operations of the country outright.

80.Duiker,

139.
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During the war Ho and his men worked closely with the
allies to remove the Japanese from China in a quid pro quo that
sought to ensure that after the war the French would not return
and Vietnam would be independent.
Following the war,
Franklin Roosevelt,

to the objection of U.S.

President

the allies felt a European occupancy was

necessary in the country and allowed the British and French to
resume control. The British essentially went along with the
wishes of the French in nearly all areas of concern. Eventually
the British relinquished any authority back to the French.
As the Japanese withdrew.

Ho found the perfect opportunity

to set up his own independent government following the French
removal by the Japanese during the war.
in Hanoi,

"On September 2,

1945,

Ho Chi Minh declared the independence of the

Democratic Republic of Vietnam."81
When the French returned.

Ho Chi Minh had established his

own government and a clash was inevitable. The revolution was
upon Vietnam.
It should be noted here that the nationalist's attempt in
Vietnam never really subsided as it had in Algeria.

81.Duiker,

135.

France,
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from its arrival through the time it left, was perpetuallyputting down nationalist movements. This is surely due to the
long and pride-filled history that many Vietnamese wished to
maintain.
Economics
When the French arrived in Vietnam,

they found a country

quite literally opposed to economic progress and very much at
the initial economic/values development point on the J-Curve.
In the years 1800-1847 the...
well-being of the nation still depended
almost exclusively on the peasant and his
rice field. And the Confucianist influence
had become an insurmountable barrier to
social and economic change, a bar to
technological advance. So it was at a time
when Vietnam seemed more powerful in Asia
than ever before in its history, it proved
less able to defend itself from foreign
invaders. . .82

France,

from its outset, began to develop an unchanging

and self-sufficient country into a modern economy. With this
modern economy came a downward turn for many Vietnamese.
were displaced,

as in Algeria,

Some

to the newly developed urban

centers created by France. Some had a hard time adapting to a

82.Ellen Hammer. Vietnam: Yesterday and Today.(Holt.
Rhinehart and Winston, Inc., New York, New York: 1966), 102.
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system of profits,

industry,

and the Western legal system. The

gap between rich and poor became accentuated with the
introduction of Western financial systems.
Many of the villages, which for centuries had kept to
themselves behind their bamboo hedges,

saw these very hedges

being destroyed by governmental and financial controls.
The process by which the gap between rich and
poor widened was speeded up by the
introduction of a modern capitalist economy
into the country. The new importance of
money, the emergence of the profit system,
the introduction of the credit to tide the
peasant over from one season to the next, the
development of new economic activities under
the French, and the colonial administration
itself which recruited a certain number of
Vietnamese to serve in its ranks
all
contributed to changes in the class
structure.83

The French did bring to Vietnam an enormous amount of
modernization. The French introduced modern irrigation
techniques into places like the Transbassac region of western
Cochin China which greatly increased rice production

(this rice

was generally exported while many in Vietnam starved);
developed a system of roads and railroads
Transindochinese line). They also...

83.Hammer,

121.

they

(most notably the
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developed ports, reinforced and extended the
dike system, and built extensive... drainage
works. Public services like hospitals and
schools were established, as were scientific
and cultural research institutes. The
Vietnamese population more than doubled under
French rule, benefitting from an extended
period of peace [no more clashes between
rival monarchs and their claim to the throne]
and from improvements in public sanitation
and in the control of epidemic diseases.84
Much like the case in Algeria,

along with population

displacement and cultural breakdown the French also brought
with them economic development to these previously middle-age
era countries.
The development of Vietnam brought greater dividends to
the French than the colonization of Algeria brought. The
exploitation of Vietnam's resources earned the French great
wealth in exports. The exports included rice

(the production

greatly elevated due to irrigation improvements introduced by
the French),

tea,

coffee,

To many Vietnamese,

rubber,

coal,

and zinc.

unlike the Algerians,

they began to

see the importance or utility of the economic progression.
Vietnam there were more people,

84.Ibid,

115-116.

especially the members of

In
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the scholarly elite, who embraced these new technological and
philosophical ideas.
Vietnam's traditional society had limited
knowledge of the modern world. Its Confucian
tenets discouraged change and rejected the
Western concept of progress. Once the door to
modernization was open by the French,
however, a multitude of new demands was
released. The more Western ideas permeated
society, the more changes were demanded. New
education expanded horizons, increasing the
desire for change, which in turn created more
social dislocation.85

Throughout Vietnam there were members of the elite who
plunged into the Western ideas immediately upon the French
arrival.
outset,

Though their numbers were relatively few at the
those that did embrace these ideas found themselves in

the position of large landowner,

entrepreneur,

or,

in some

cases as government officials helping to bridge the gap between
the French administration and the populous.
Thus the French identity was welcomed in certain circles
can be verified.

In two specific areas,

education and language,

the French made a significant impact on the Vietnamese. The
traditional education system was not practical for any
Vietnamese person who wished to move his country forward. And

85.Bain,

20.
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the Vietnamese more eagerly sought Western based education than
the Algerians.
One of the few things on which Vietnamese
nationalists and their french rulers agreed
was that the traditional education system was
deficient both in substance and method. For
many centuries this system had relied
exclusively on the old Confucianist manuals,
ignoring the natural sciences and mathematics
-which were subjects necessary to the
development of modern technology and
economics.86
The French also opened the lycees

(elementary schools)

in

increasing numbers to Vietnamese children in Hanoi and Saigon.
Many of those Vietnamese students who finished in these schools
went to either the University of Hanoi or,

in some cases,

to

Paris to complete their education. These schools were not open
to the Vietnamese until the introduction of Quoc Ngu Romanized script

[of the Vietnamese language]

"the

first introduced

in the seventeenth century"87
Quoc Ngu was the means for introducing Vietnam to Western
culture and ideals.

It was a better tool than Chinese and

conveyed ideals and the future tense more effectively and

86.Hammer,
87.Ibid,

123.

124.
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efficiently than the characters of either Chinese or Vietnamese
script.
The contrast between the larger number of people who
readily identified with these Western ideas and became
economically successful in Vietnam with the smaller number who
either did not,

or could not,

in the same time frame in Algeria

places the two countries differently on the J-Curve.
Curve holds,

If the J-

Vietnam would have seen a more rapid development,

based on the evidence above,
It should be noted,
Western ideals,

along the J-Curve.

however,

principals,

that the adaptation to

and language was not universal in

the country.
In contact with French culture, the grip of
the old traditions and outlook on many
members of the educated class was bound to
weaken. However, it should be kept in mind
that Westernization -- largely confined to
the urban population -- was and still is,
slow and superficial. In many instances it
had simply the negative effect of
discrediting the past, thus leaving a
cultural vacuum which later was often filled
by Communist doctrines.88

Vietnamese access to positions within the French
administration were not as open as they were in Algeria.

88.Bain,

102.

In
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Vietnam the French chose to utilize either their own,

home¬

grown personnel or ethnic Chinese in the job as go-between,

or

middle man, with the population. The French would have chosen
to utilize the indigenous population for this role,
developed in Algeria,
better the needs,

as they had

because the indigenous people understood

desires,

and weakness of their own more so

than an outsider. They could also communicate on the same
level.

In Vietnam,

positions

however,

those most qualified to hold these

(the scholarly elite)

were more often than not on the

side of anticolonialism and sought to restore Vietnam to its
emperor-led feudal system.
In summary, Vietnam was a static and self-sufficient
country when the French arrived.

Its economic progress was well

behind Western measures and would place it at the initial point
on the J-Curve. Though early efforts by nationalists were made
to return to the precolonial system, many of the Western ideals
and technologies were employed by later nationalists. There was
a significantly larger portion of Vietnamese that found
prosperity in the French system than had in Algeria. This
segment of the population seems to have moved up the J-Curve at
a much faster, more developed pace,

than the Evolues had in
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Algeria. At the same time displacement,

cultural breakdown,

and

high taxation plagued the masses of people.
Lastly,

there was no significant economic development that

triggered the revolution in Vietnam. The revolution was
developing from the time the French arrived and found its
window of opportunity with the developments of World War II.

Chapter 4
CONCLUSIONS
Both Vietnam and Algeria were colonized countries in which
the revolutions in these two countries overthrew the colonial
powers.

In James Davies' works the closest he comes to a study

of this variety is that of the American Revolution. This is
significant in several ways.

First,

the American Revolution was

a conflict between people of essentially the same culture and
language;

the Algerian and Vietnamese Revolutions were fought

by people of opposing cultures and language.
Americans were,

in all respects,

rule of the mother country;

Secondly,

the

the colonizers shedding the

in Algeria and Vietnam it was the

indigenous populations shedding the invading rulers. However,
all three of these revolutions do share a common bond: all
three groups sought to free themselves from an outside ruler
and become independent.
In Davies'
Revolutions,

other works,

such as the French and Russian

he deals with the overthrow of a domestic

government by the citizenry.
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The American Revolution is cited here because of the data
Davies uses to apply it to the J-Curve.

In his work on this

revolution Davies never distinguishes between the economic
development of the elite,

landed class that led the revolution

and the economic development of the masses in America.
Actually,

he does not purposely do so in any of his studies;

it

only becomes apparent in his Dorr's rebellion study because the
rebellious group in that situation was small and homogeneous.
In applying the data from the Algeria and Vietnam
situations to the J-Curve there are two specific differences,
and one similarity,

that must be addressed.

First,

in each case

there was overall economic development implemented by the
French.

In both countries the infrastructure was vastly

improved with roads and railroads,

education was developed

along Western lines of philosophy and values,

and health care

was brought in that greatly improved the mortality rates
resulting in exploding population growth.
most significantly,

Secondly,

and maybe

there was economic/value development on two

separate levels in both countries.

In Algeria,

the E-volv.es were

much more prosperous than the general population.

In Vietnam,

the scholarly elite from precolonial times continued to thrive
and benefit from the French presence as the village population
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continued in traditional ways - never really benefitting from
the improvements and implementations.

Third,

Algeria and

Vietnam were at the same point on the J-Curve when the French
arrived as America was when British colonization began.
Thus,

in this study the populations must be studied with

the two differences in mind - something Davies did not do in
his American Revolution study.

Algerian Findings
Algeria was most definitely at the initial point on the JCurve of mere survival when the French arrived. The population
was one of tribes whose continued existence depended more on
mother nature than on the feats of humans.
The evidence from that moment forward does not show an
economic upward trend for the indigenous population.
displacement,

taxation,

The heavy

and unemployment of the general

population continued through the 1954 revolution. The rewards
for the economic development most often went to the colons.
Thus,

the general population appears to be more in line with

the Aspirational Deprivation model proposed by Gurr.

The

general population's value position never improves while at the
same time they see their value expectations being achieved by
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the colons and the Evolues

(the beni-oui-ouis) .

It is evident

that their frustrations are channeled through revolutionary
leaders such as Messali Hadj because he was not an evolues and
spoke the same language as those that had been left behind in
the development.
The Evolues segment of the population shows a clear
development along the J-Curve pattern. Their existence is tied
to the general population up to the end of the nineteenth
century.

From that point forward they begin to achieve economic

progression by securing administrative positions and jobs and
educational opportunities in France. Their progression,
often thwarted by the colons,

though

continued to move up as they

achieved small concessions from the French government.

Some of

those achievements include the passage of the private-property
code,

financial autonomy from the French,

Charter. These achievements,

and the Algerian

though often watered down, were

value gains none the less.
The downward turn on the curve occurs with failure of the
Blum-Violette plan to become enacted. At this point the liberal
efforts to work with the French are shunned by the population
in favor of the conservative naitionalists that favored
expulsion of the French altogether.
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The revolution,
if the French

it can be argued,

(and colons particular)

could have been avoided
had worked more

diligently with the liberals and granted more of the demands
put forth.(Of course,

there are those who argue that the

revolution was inevitable.)

The French refusal to capitulate on

one more demand - the Blum-Violette Plan - resulted in a
revolution carried out not from the liberal position but from
the conservative nationalists.
The method Davies used to study the American Revolution,
if applied to the Algerian case, would fit his model perfectly.
However,

the population's bi-level development suggests that

both the J-Curve and Aspirational models are appropriate.

Vietnam Findings
As noted above Vietnam,

though clearly ahead of Algeria in

economic development when colonization began, was at the
initial economic point when the French arrived, when one
considers the development that was to come.
Economic development for most Vietnamese never
materialized. Most of the population, which inhabited the
villages,

never experienced a value improvement - if anything

they experienced Progressive Deprivation with displacement and
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cultural breakdown. The vast majority of the population held
firmly to their Confucian-based principles and,
surmise,

one can

never experienced a value expectation based upon the

improvements brought by the French.

If this segment of the

population's economic development must apply to either model
it,

like the Algerian masses, would better fit the Aspirational

deprivation model. However,

their desire and determination to

retain their centuries old subsistence and lifestyle suggest
they experienced no value expectation that was not fulfilled.
The elite class from Vietnam's feudal system evolved
similarly to the Evolues with the exception that the elites of
Vietnam were quicker to grasp the Western methods and did so
more eagerly.

Initially,

the Vietnamese elite strove diligently

to maintain the precolonial structure by rejecting Western
ideas.

But it wasn't long before they saw the benefits they

could derive from those ideas in their own struggle.
Part of the elite class sought the material benefits of
this development and worked closely with the French. Their
value expectations were fulfilled in the form of business
ownership,

government positions,

and large-tract land

ownership.

This group worked diligently toward improving
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Franco-Vietnamese relations in an effort to continue fulfilling
increasing value expectations.
The remaining,

and larger portion,

of the elite saw the

Western ideals and progress brought in as a tool they could use
to expel the French and strengthen their position in Asia. Many
of the nationalist figures from the nineteenth century up to Ho
Chi Minh used this framework to further their cause.
Ironically,
brought,

though they used the innovations the French

they never saw their own lot improve. Not because they

were denied the opportunity;
conservative,
cultural.

rather they held on to

precolonial ideals that rejected Western

This group,

like the general population, would more

appropriately fit the Aspirational model.
There was no downward economic turn that triggered the
Vietnamese Revolution.

Its centuries old existence as an

independent nation was a continual catalyst for the
nationalists in their endeavor to oust the French colonizers.
The trigger for this revolution,

if one can be found, was the

power vacuum left when the Japanese withdrew after World War
II. This gave Ho Chi Minh the occasion to establish his own
government which led to the confrontation with France in the
ensuing revolution.
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Both of these cases,

if viewed from Davies'

own method,

could apply differently to the J-Curve and Aspirational models.
If one only views the economic development of the country as
value expectations being fulfilled,

then the Algerian

revolution would definitely fit the J-Curve model:
economic,

educational,

there was

and social development for the country

as a whole and there was a downward turn in the ability to
fulfill the needs satisfaction following the failure of the
Blum-Violette Plan. From that point on the revolution began to
develop into fruition.
The Vietnamese Revolution, however,

does not fit the J-

Curve when viewed this way. Though economic and educational
development prospered for the country as a whole,

there was no

downward economic turn that signaled an expectation that values
achieved would be lost or furthered.
Having done this study it appears to the author that
Davies' vision of populations and their revolutions takes an
exceedingly narrow approach by virtue of his methods. His
studies of the economic development,
are broad and encompassing.

save for Dorr's Rebellion,

In. the cases studied here the

populations are bi-level in their ability to satisfy their
needs expectations. Was this the case in the American

81
revolution? Further study of that revolution would be required.
In summary,

neither of the revolutions in this study fit

the J-Curve nor the Aspirational model. The values achievement
/expectations shows the general population of both Algeria and
Vietnam during the colonial period to fit the Aspirational
model. The Evolues of Algeria seem to fit the J-Curve model
impressively. Lastly,
conform,

the elite nationalists of Vietnam

though uncomfortably,

to the Aspirational model.
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